This is a bird’s eye view mapping the categories of possible opinions within the Egyptian political theater. The map depicts only the period from June 30th 2013 onwards. The names of certain groups or parties are intentionally not included and so are left to the reader to think for a moment where the party in question does fit now, months ago, and possibly in a year later.
The relative sizes of these shapes do not represent their categories’ actual weight on the ground. Similarly, the colors are only picked for better visibility and have no hidden reference to anything. One party or group fits nicely inside a single category, while another can span over more than one category or even makes a transition between two categories over time.
Why is this Important?
To understand what’s really going on, it helps to remove all labels and construct a clear map of the scene. In addition, we have noticed that many people face a difficulty conveying their opinion correctly or without being misunderstood. So this classification will certainly help at least some people to illustrate their position, whether they belong to a political party or not. It is also a useful reference to be used by those interested in debunking the plethora of false narratives out there in the media within the local, international, and social spheres.
The Complex Scene
A group of people (i.e., categories A, E, I, and F) believe that the demonstrations of June the 30th, 2013, were a genuine revolution against Morsi and his group (or just him). The common ground between categories A and I is that they both don’t think that July 3rd can be described as a military coup. The difference is that group I thinks that the involvement of the generals in politics is wrong, yet the current involvement for them is only an undesired but temporary measure. As for group A, it doesn’t matter if the generals get involved in politics indefinitely, just as they have been doing for more than 60 years. On the other hand, groups E and F think this revolution of June 30th , which they supported, was followed by a military coup in July 3rd 2013, which they oppose. Those too are split. One of them (F) believes that the generals must not get involved at all in any sort of political game. The opinion of the other category (E) regarding this matter is a bit opportunistic though, i.e., it depends on whether they get a piece of the political pie or not.
That’s not all. There’s another group of people (i.e., categories B, H, G, and C) who also have their own unique understandings. They all share the common opinion that July 3rd was a military coup while June 30th was merely an artificial pretext to it. However they too become split when it comes to further details. Groups B and C are the opportunistic folks who would not hesitate to let the generals play politics, as long as they are not excluded from the game. Perhaps by making a fresh deal similar to that of 2011. The only difference between these two categories is that one (C) insists on Morsi’s return to presidency, while the other (B) believes that it’s not a realistic condition and that other alternatives can be accepted. Relatively, categories H and G are a bit more revolutionary in the sense that they both agree that the generals should strictly stay out of both the visible and hidden corners of the political theater. Yet those too are split on whether the return of Morsi to his pre-July-3rd post is a realistic demand or not.
Finally, remains a perhaps small category of folks who refuse to fit under any of the mentioned categories. Those are the people in category D who didn’t support June 30th. Maybe out of suspicion of those who called for it, or because they could estimate the consequences of ousting a president that early, etc. These are just examples for their possible reasons, while there could be other reasons for them not to support June 30. Anyway. So how come don’t they consider July 3rd as a military coup? In this regard they are similar to those under category I. They also believe that Morsi’s ouster was going to happen sooner or later. According to this view, the military’s role in July 3rd was necessary and temporary despite being undesired.
The mainstream media narrative fails to correctly answer this question. If you follow the news headlines, you will notice how all protests are either labeled as “pro-Morsi” or “pro-Muslim-Brotherhood (MB)”. Doing so, the mainstream media wipes out any trace of the independent and non politicized student struggle demanding justice for their comrades. They also (the media) give a false link between opposing the regime in Egypt and being affiliated to the MB. In fact, there exist a sector of activists that openly opposes the MB and regime before and after June 30, but those are constantly ignored by the western media for some reason. Ever wondered why the western media is doing this?
On the other hand, you will sometimes face some fake Egyptian activists who get so angry when you describe the current almost daily demonstrations as “anti-regime”. That is despite of them being idle and doing nothing for months to express any opposition to the regime! The only explanation to such reaction is that they don’t feel comfortable when others are called “anti-regime”, because it exposes what they are not. For them the mainstream media narrative is very comforting as they can keep claiming being anti-regime while remaining silent at home as the real “anti-regime” folks get slaughtered in the streets.
So this is how different groups in Egypt think after June 30. Who is right and who is wrong is out of this article’s scope. We’re interested in reading your feedback. Could this map make things more clear to you? Did we miss a category? Where do you find yourself within this map? Did you make a transition in the past months from one category to another? What is your reasoning? Tell us your thoughts in the comments section below.